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INTRODUCTION
The question in some states is not whether judicial
independence can be preserved, but whether it can be attained.
Courts that have historically allowed racial, economic, political
and other improper considerations to influence their decisions
cannot easily shed a legal culture developed over decades. In
addition, misperceptions about the role of the judiciary and the
elections of judges may thwart any progress toward judicial
independence and the rule of law. However, attaining an
independent state judiciary is critically important because of the
rapidly declining-some would say evaporating-role of the
federal courts in enforcing the Bill of Rights on behalf of racial
minorities, the poor, and others for whom the Bill of Rights is the
only protection from the government.
While these issues can be raised in many parts of the country,
consideration of them is particularly appropriate here in the
South, where the state courts have not been independent and
have played a major role in defiance of the law. I will discuss our
history, the problems of elections, and the misperceptions and
then assess whether we have much cause for hope that
independence will be obtained and what we might do to help
achieve it.
I. OVERCOMING HISTORY
The southern states and their courts have a long history of
defying the rule of law, particularly federal constitutional law, in
the areas of race and criminal justice.' This history has
I Director, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia; Visiting Lecturer
in Law, Yale, Harvard, and Emory Law Schools; B.. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of
Kentucky. The author is most grateful to his research assistants at Yale Law School,
Fiona Doherty and Jean Giles, for their assistance in preparing this Article.
1. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (3d ed. 1992); A. LEON
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profoundly influenced the state courts and judges. Federal courts
played a central role in the 1960s and 1970s in ending injustices
that state courts had tolerated or participated in for decades.
They ordered an end to racial discrimination in every institution
of society and to human rights abuses in prisons and mental
institutions. They granted writs of habeas corpus when the state
courts refused to recognize constitutional violations in criminal
cases. More recently, however, the federal courts have been in
full retreat as protectors of the Bill of Rights as the nation has
moved into a new era of states' rights.
A State Court Defiance and Resistance
Before the Civil War, one could at least argue that the
Constitution sanctioned the "peculiar institution" of slavery, and
that the failure of the state courts to protect the rights of
Africans and their descendants brought here against their will
was in conformity with the law, as unjust as it was. However,
after the Civil War and passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, the courts had the constitutional
obligation to provide equal protection of the law to all citizens
and to guarantee the right to vote regardless of race.
However, the state courts in the South provided the freed
slaves no protection at all. Instead, they played a major role in
continuing their oppression. Perhaps the worst example of this
defiance was the involvement of the courts in many states,
including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, in
maintaining a system of convicting and leasing people that was
the virtual perpetuation of slavery.' Convict leasing "was
designed for black, not white, convicts."3 When a work force was
needed, men would be arrested for vagrancy and other minor
crimes, convicted and then leased to plantations, railroads,
turpentine camps, or others who needed cheap labor.4 One
participant in the practice admitted, "it was possible to send a
negro to prison on almost any pretext but difficult to get a white
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS (1978).
2. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WoRsE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHmiAN FARM AND THE
ORDEAL OF Jim CROW JusTcE 35-37, 40-50, 55-81 (1996).
3. Id. at 41.
4. See id. at 74.
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there, unless he committed a very heinous crime."5 Many
convicts were literally worked to death.6 One historian has
observed that "[t]he South's economic development can be traced
by the blood of its prisoners."'
On the other hand, the legal system usually failed to punish
whites who engaged in violence against African-Americans. At
least 4743 people were killed by lynch mobs.8 More than ninety
percent of the lynchings took place in the South, and three-
fourths of the victims were African-Americans.' The threat that
Congress might pass an anti-lynching statute in the early 1920s
led Southern states to "replace lynchings with a more
'humane]... method of racial control'-the judgment and
imposition of capital sentences by all-white juries."" Once
again, the courts ignored the rule of law to satisfy popular
passions. As one historian observed:
Southerners... discovered that lynchings were untidy and
created a bad press.... [L]ynchings were increasingly
replaced by situations in which the Southern legal system
prostituted itself to the mob's demand. Responsible officials
begged would-be lynchers to "let the law take its course,"
thus tacitly promising that there would be a quick trial and
the death penalty.... [S]uch proceedings "retained the
essence of mob murder, shedding only its outward forms.""
Mississippi's legal system "allowed whites to exploit blacks
without legal limit, to withhold the most basic rights and
safeguards while claiming to be indulgent, paternalistic, and fair.
5. Id. at 72 (quoting J. C. Powell, THE AERICAN SIBERIA, OR FOURTEEN YEARS'
EXPERIENCE IN A SOUTHERN CONVICT CAMP 332 (1881)).
6. See id. at 46 (mortality rate of Mississippi's conviction population ranged from
9% to 16% in the 1880s).
7. Id. at 60.
8. These numbers come from the archives at Tuskegee University, where lynchings
have been documented since 1882. Mark Curriden, The Legacy of Lynching, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Jan. 15, 1995, at Ml; see also W. FTIJIUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN
THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); GEORGE C. WRIGHT,
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865-1940: LYNCHINGs, MOB RULE, AND "LEGAL
LYNCHINGS" (1990).
9. See Curriden, supra note 8, at M1.
10. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
80 (1990) (quoting MICHAEL BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 22-26
(1987)).
11. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 115 (rev.
ed. 1992).
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Worse, perhaps, it turned the criminal justice system into a
corrupt and capricious entity, utterly undeserving of respect."2
Shocking abuses in the criminal justice systems of the South
were only occasionally corrected by the United States Supreme
Court. In Brown v. Mississippi,"3 the Court reviewed a decision
by the Mississippi Supreme Court that upheld death sentences
for three black men. Quoting from the dissenting opinion of a
justice of the Mississippi court, the U.S. Supreme Court described
how confessions had been obtained from the three defendants:
Upon [Ellington's] denial, [the deputy sheriff and other men]
seized him, and with the participation of the deputy they
hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and having let
him down, they hung him again, and when he was let down
the second time, and he still protested his innocence, he was
tied to a tree and whipped, and still declining to accede to the
demands that he confess, he was finally released and he
returned with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense
pain and agony. The record of the testimony shows that the
signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible during the
so-called trial.'4
The authorities persisted until a confession was obtained:
A day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by
another, returned to the home of the said defendant and
arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the jail
in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into
the State of Alabama; and while on the way, in that state,
the deputy stopped and again severely whipped the
defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping
until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess
to such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did
so, after which he was delivered to jail."3
The same techniques were used to extract confessions from the
other two defendants:
The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields,
were also arrested and taken to the same jail. On Sunday
12. OSEINSKY, supra note 2, at 124.
13. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
14. Id. at 281 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting)).
15. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Brown, 161 So. at 470).
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night, April 1, 1934, the same deputy, accompanied by a
number of white men, one of whom was also an officer, and
by the jailer, came to the jail, and the two last named
defendants were made to strip and they were laid over chairs
and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with
buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the said
deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would be
continued unless and until they confessed, and not only
confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as
demanded by those present; and in this manner the
defendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings
progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their
confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the
demands of their torturers. When the confessions had been
obtained in the exact form and contents as desired by the
mob, they left with the parting admonition and warning that,
if the defendants changed their story at any time in any
respect from that last stated, the perpetrators of the outrage
would administer the same or equally effective treatment. 6
While this passed for justice in Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that "the transcript reads more like pages torn from
some medieval account, than a record made within the confines
of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened
constitutional government." 7
In Chambers v. Florida," the Court reversed a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court upholding death sentences for several
"ignorant young colored tenant farmers" who were put in prison,
beaten, threatened, and questioned almost continuously until
they "confessed." 9 Twice the Court reversed the convictions and
death sentences of the "Scottsboro Boys," the African-American
youths sentenced to death for rape in Scottsboro, Alabama. °
But the Court did not review many other cases, such as the
conviction of Linnie Jackson, a black woman who was sentenced
in the early 1950s to five years in an Alabama penitentiary for
marrying a white man.2' It was not until 1967 that the Court
16. Id. at 282 (quoting Brown, 161 So. at 470).
17. Id. (quoting Brown, 161 So. at 470).
18. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
19. Id. at 238-39.
20. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reversing because of racial
discrimination in jury selection); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing
because of denial of counsel to the accused); CARTER, supra note 11, at 161-63, 322-
24.
21. See Jackson v. State, 72 So.2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App.) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888
822 GEORGIA STATE UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:817
held state miscegenation laws to be unconstitutional.' The trial
and execution of John Downer, an African-American man who
was probably innocent of the rape for which he was put to
death,' was one of many instances in which the state courts
acquiesced to popular passions and prejudices instead of
enforcing the law.'
African-Americans were denied participation in the southern
legal systems that had such an impact on their lives. Although
the Supreme Court struck down in 1879 a West Virginia statute
that limited jury service to white people,' states continued to
exclude blacks or provide only token representation in jury
pools.2"
The Georgia Supreme Court in 1955 openly defied the United
States Supreme Court with regard to the exclusion of black
people from jury service in the case of Aubrey Williams, an
African-American man sentenced to death." Williams, like the
(1954).
22. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. See Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter
in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 215
(1996).
24. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 11, at 104-36.
25. See Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
26. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (describing repeated efforts of
jury commissioners in Mitchell County, Georgia to exclude blacks from jury service);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88 (1955) (finding that no black person had ever
served on a grand jury in Cobb County, Georgia; that of 534 names on the grand
jury list, there were only six blacks, one did not reside in the county, two were over
80, and one was partially deaf and the other in poor health, the other three were
62); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1945) (finding no equal protection violation
even though jury commissioners in Dallas County, Texas admitted they "had no
intention of placing more than one negro on the panel"); id. at 408-09 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that no black person had ever served on a grand jury in Dallas
County until the court's decision in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942), and
expressing view that equal protection requires consideration of black citizens for jury
service "without numerical or proportional limitation"); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950) (finding that since Akins, Dallas County jury commissioners had limited
number of blacks on grand jury to not more than one and holding this limitation
unconstitutional); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reversing because of total
exclusion of blacks from jury pool); CARTER, supra note 11, at 326-27 (describing
resistance to decision in Norris in South). See generally Morris B. Hoffman,
Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 809, 827-32 (1997) (discussing history of exclusion of blacks from juries).
27. Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 207, 78 S.E.2d 521 (1953), extraordinary motion
denied, 210 Ga. 665, 82 S.E.2d 217 (1954), remanded sub nom. Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375 (1955), reaffirmed, 211 Ga. 763, 88 S.E.2d 376 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 950 (1956); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court
1998]CAN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE BE ATTAINED IN THE SOUTH? 823
defendant in Avery v. Georgia,28 was tried by a jury in Fulton
County selected by drawing tickets which were one color for
whites and another color for blacks. In Avery, the Court found
that this system unconstitutionally excluded African-Americans
and reversed the conviction and death sentence.29 However,
instead of reversing Williams' conviction, the Court held that
"orderly procedure requires a remand to the State Supreme
Court for reconsideration of the case,""° and expressed its
confidence that "the courts of Georgia would [not] allow this man
to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a
jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally
impaneled.""'
The Court's confidence was misplaced. Two days after receiving
the opinion, Georgia Chief Justice W. Henry Duckworth, writing
for a unanimous court-without the benefit of briefs or
arguments-issued an opinion quoting the full text of the Tenth
Amendment "followed by a brief and contemptuous dismissal of
the U.S. Supreme Court's judgment."32 Duckworth held that the
U.S. Supreme Court had issued an unconstitutional judgment
that the Georgia Supreme Court was not bound to respect.33 The
Georgia Supreme Court's opinion was widely reported and
praised by newspaper columnists, legislators, justices of other
state supreme courts and by the Georgia Bar, which passed a
resolution congratulating the court. 4
Remarkably, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari and
Williams was put to death.35 One scholar has thoroughly
documented the developments in the case and argued that the
U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to reverse Williams' conviction was
part of an "informal strategy" of the Court to "avoid unnecessary
confrontations with Southern governments over ancillary racial
issues"" in hope of gaining compliance with Brown v. Board of
Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994).
28. 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
29. See id.
30. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955).
31. Id.
32. Dickson, supra note 27, at 1457. Another writer characterized the Georgia
court's response as telling the U.S. Supreme Court to go to hell. See BARRETT
PRETThiAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 290 (1961).
33. See Williams v. State, 211 Ga. 763, 763-64, 88 S.E.2d 376, 376-77 (1955).
34. See Dickson, supra note 27, at 1468-71.
35. See id. at 1465; Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
36. Dickson, supra note 27, at 1472.
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Education.17 However-in addition to costing a man his life-the
Court's retreat in Williams had the opposite result of
encouraging further defiance.38
The Florida Supreme Court engaged in similar defiance of the
U.S. Supreme Court in preventing the admission of an African-
American to the University of Florida College of Law in the
1950s. 9 In Alabama, George C. Wallace, as a young circuit
judge, defied the federal courts to advance his political career.
Upon learning that federal officials were investigating
underrepresentation of African-Americans in jury pools in a
Georgia county, Wallace proclaimed to an all-white grand jury in
Bullock County, Alabama, that he would not allow the federal
law-enforcement officials to inspect his records." Wallace then
called the Associated Press to report this "news."4 Wallace later
defied an order by U.S. District Court Judge Frank Johnson to
produce voting records and sought to be held in contempt in
order to benefit politically from a confrontation with the federal
court.
42
Defiance of federal law at the local level did not always receive
as much attention, but it had the same effect of denying African-
Americans participation in the justice system. For example, black
citizens in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia were excluded
for years and then underrepresented in the jury pools. In 1966,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this discrimination
violated the Constitution.' In 1972, the Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion in another case from the county,44 and
three justices pointed out that the way in which juries were
being selected in the county violated 18 U.S.C. § 243, which
makes it a criminal offense to exclude persons from jury service
on the basis of race.45
Despite these federal court decisions, the unconstitutional,
systematic underrepresentation continued throughout the 1970s.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Dickson, supra note 27, at 1472.
39. See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights
Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 879-84 (1994).
40. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STOPi: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M.
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVL RIGHTS 185 (1993).
41. See id.; DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE 84 (1995).
42. See BASS, supra note 40, at 187-92.
43. See Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966).
44. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
45. See id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring).
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Continued underrepresentation was made possible in part
because the judges appointed a lawyer to defend indigents who
would not, as a matter of "policy," file challenges to the
underrepresentation of blacks in the jury pool for fear of
incurring hostility from the community.46
As a result, at the capital trial of a black man in Columbus,
Georgia in 1977-eleven years after the Fifth Circuit decision
and five years after the Supreme Court warned that the
exclusion of black citizens violated federal criminal statutes-
there were only eight black citizens in a venire of 160 persons.47
A venire that fairly represented the community would have
included fifty black citizens. The case was tried by an all-white
jury," which imposed the death penalty.49
The few African-Americans who made it into jury pools and
were called for possible jury service, were usually sent back home
by the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. The U.S.
Supreme Court was presented with evidence in 1965 that no
African-American had ever sat on a trial jury in Talladega
County, Alabama, even though the population of the county was
twenty-six percent African-American. ° Over fifteen years later,
the "standard operating procedure" of the District Attorney's
Office in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama was "to use the
peremptory challenges to strike as many blacks as possible from
the venires in cases involving serious crimes."5' A federal court
found that prosecutors in Tuscaloosa also "manipulated the trial
46. See Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 880 F.2d 293,
293-97 (Clark, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945
(1989).
47. See Challenge to the Petit Jury Array filed in State v. Brooks, Indictment No.
3888 (Nov. 1977), on appeal, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), vacated and
remanded, 446 U.S. 961 (1980), on remand, 246 Ga. 262, 271 S.E.2d 172 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 921 (1981) (conviction and death sentence vacated on other grounds
sub nom.); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), vacated and
remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), decision adhered to on remand, 809 F.2d 700 (11th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
48. See Trial Judge's Report to the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Brooks,
Indictment No. 3888, at 6, § E(4).
49. See id.
50. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205, 223 (1965). Nevertheless, the Court
found that the defendant had not established a violation of equal protection because
he had not demonstrated that prosecutors were responsible for the systemic exclusion
of blacks from the juries. See id. at 224-26. The standard of proof established in
Swain was later modified in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Jackson v. Thigpen, 752 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd in part
and affd in part, sub nom., Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1995).
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docket in their effort to preserve the racial purity of criminal
juries. Inasmuch as they actually set the criminal trial dockets
until 1982, they implemented a scheme in which juries with
fewer black venirepersons would be called for the serious
cases."
52
There has been defiance in other areas as well. The most
significant has been the failure of state courts to implement the
Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,3 requiring
the states to provide lawyers for poor people accused of crimes.
Poor people facing a loss of life or liberty in many states are
routinely assigned-usually by a judge-a lawyer who lacks the
knowledge, skills, resources, and often even the inclination to
defend a case properly.'
Georgia's Superior Court judges, along with the state's
prosecutors, opposed the Georgia Bar's efforts after Gideon to
establish a state-wide system of indigent defense. 5 That
opposition delayed any state funding for years and has prevented
to this day the establishment of a comprehensive indigent
defense system. Many state courts, including the one in Sumter
County, Georgia, still do not provide lawyers to poor people who
can be jailed for minor offenses," in defiance of the Supreme
52. Id. at 1555.
53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
54. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WiM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91
(1995); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
625 (1986); Poor Man's Justice, Am. LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45-87 (compromising
13 articles describing inadequacy of representation for indigent defendants in various
parts of country). States still do not even provide adequate counsel in capital cases.
See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
Death Penalty Cases, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (finding after an exhaustive study
that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at trial" was one of the
"principal failings of the capital punishment systems in the states today"); Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The
Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993); Douglas
W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary
Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995).
55. See MIKE MEARS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GEORGIA INDIGENT DEFENSE ACT
(1996) (available from the Georgia Indigent Defense Council, Atlanta, Georgia).
56. See Ann Woolner, Guilty in Americus? Forget Lawyers, Just Plead Guilty,
FULTON CouNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 23, 1996, at 1 (describing failure to provide
lawyers in Sumter County, Georgia); Klein, supra note 54, at 659 (collecting studies
showing that defense systems throughout country are violating Argersinger).
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Court's 1972 decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin,7 which requires
the appointment of counsel in such cases.
Usually, this history is simply ignored. It is nothing to be
proud of and it is tempting to believe it no longer has an impact
on courts today. But in the South, as Faulkner said, "The past is
never dead. It's not even past.""8 Practices and attitudes
developed over centuries become part of the legal culture and are
not easily erased. The Confederate battle flag, part of the Georgia
state flag, 9 is still displayed in Georgia's courtrooms. Some of
the other more overt manifestations of racism have been replaced
by more covert or unconscious racism."
The relationship of this history to what happens in criminal
courts today is illustrated by the Texas case of Clarence Lee
Brandley. A police officer charged Brandley, a janitor, with the
rape and murder of a white high school student instead of white
suspects because "the nigger," as the officer referred to Brandley,
"*¢as big enough to have committed the crime; therefore, 'the
nigger [is] elected.' "61 Brandley was tried twice. On both
occasions, the prosecutors used all their peremptory strikes
against blacks to get all-white juries, as was the normal practice
of the Montgomery County prosecutor's office. 2 Although "a
powerful feeling of prejudice and racial tension pervaded the
courtroom" at the first trial, 3 the jury was unable to agree on a
57. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
58. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1950).
59. See Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding Confederate
battle flag as part of Georgia's state flag).
60. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (acknowledging possible influence
of unconscious racism on sentencing decision in capital cases). The way in which such
racial prejudice may come into play in decisionmaking has been described in detail by
many scholars. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559,
1571 (1989) (describing tendency of people to make decisions based on "racial
stereotypes and assumptions"); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White
Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (documenting tendency among whites to convict
black defendants in instances when white defendants would be acquitted); Charles R.
Lawrence, III, The ID, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758; Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 708 (1989) (describing psychological tendency of
predominantly white decisionmakers to sympathize more with whites than with
blacks).
61. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tx. Crim. App. 1989).
62. See id. at 926 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (quoting from findings of trial judge in
post-conviction proceedings).
63. Id. at 927.
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verdict. At a second trial, where a reviewing judge found that a
"'project like' mentality" on the part of the judge, prosecutor and
court clerk "overbore any sense of justice and decency,"' the all-
white jury sentenced Brandley to death.
Brandley was freed after the CBS News program 60 Minutes
publicized his innocence,65 and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals was forced to acknowledge the unfairness of his trial."
The treatment of Brandley was consistent with the treatment
that black people had long received in Montgomery County:
The story of Clarence Brandley rang with echoes from [the
lynching of a black man a few days before Christmas in
18851: the rules of law that had been abandoned; the judge
who had fallen in with the mob; the press that had relished
his fate; the 'qeading citizens of the county" who had
committed the crime; the bodyguard of new civil rights that
had turned and deserted him; the whole town that had stood
by and let it happen. And that was the loudest echo of all.
It was part of the corruption that had become a way of
life .... Not only had the whites always got away with it, but
they had also always been able to justify it. Killing one black
man was a means of disciplining the whole of his community.
Just as a secret police force tries to quell the courage of a
whole people by arresting its figureheads, just as terrorists
try to frighten a whole society by throwing fear into the lives
of each of its members, so the white people of Montgomery
County had for years ruled black people with fear by picking
off their young men. Murder was disguised as a necessary
social task.
The ordeal Clarence Brandley suffered was an attempt at
a legal lynching. It was the law, not an old rope, that was
twisted into a deadly weapon, but the intention of those who
attacked him was just as surely to kill him, as their
predecessors had killed young black men in the past.67
Other vestiges of discrimination that occurred years ago still
infect the courts and affect their decisions. One of the most
64. Id. at 928.
65. See NICK DAVIES, WHITE LIES: RAPE, MURDER, AND JUSTICE TExAs STYLE 307-
09 (1991).
66. See Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 894-95.
67. DAVIES, supra note 65, at 395-96, 402.
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significant is that African-Americans and other minorities remain
largely excluded from the justice system. The history of legalized
oppression has resulted in very few people of color sitting as
judges. Of Alabama's 381 district, circuit, probate and appellate
judges only eighteen are black.6" Of Florida's 456 circuit
judges,69 only sixteen are black7 and eighteen are Hispanic.7
Of Georgia's 152 Superior Court judges,72 only nineteen are
black.73 Of South Carolina's forty-three circuit judges,74 only
four are black.7' Of Texas' 396 district court judges,76 only
twelve are black77 and forty-two are Hispanic.7" There is little
likelihood that the bench will become more representative in the
next several decades since states are allowed to elect judges from
districts in which the voting power of black citizens is diluted.79
Members of racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in
jury pools and excluded in the jury selection process.8 0
The absence of the perspectives of people who have had
different life experiences has an adverse impact on the quality of
decision making, which often is detrimental to the excluded
minorities. An African-American member of the Georgia Supreme
Court has observed that, "[wlhen it comes to grappling with
racial issues in the criminal justice system today, often white
68. See Associated Press, Blacks Trying for Judgeships Have Tough Time,
MONTGomERY ADv., Jan. 13, 1998, at A3.
69. See DIRECTORY OF STATE COURT CLERKS & COUNTY COURTHOUSES 46 (Robert S.
Want ed., 1997) [hereinafter DIRECTORY].
70. AIERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED
STATES 29-30 (1997) [hereinafter ABA DIRECTORY].
71. See id. at 164-65.
72. See DIRECTORY, supra note 69, at 52.
73. See ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 34.
74. See DIRECTORY, supra note 69, at 232.
75. See ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 100.
76. See DIRECTORY, supra note 69, at 250.
77. See ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 70, at 106-07.
78. See id. at 209-12.
79. See Brooks v. State Board of Elections, 173 F.R.D. 547 (S.D. Ga. 1997)
(dismissing challenge to Georgia's system of electing judges after settlement, which
would have increased number of minority judges); White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058
(11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a settlement that would have resulted in an increase in
number of minority judges on appellate courts in Alabama); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d
1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting challenge based on dilution of black vote in
judicial elections in Florida); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (upholding
Texas' single-district system of electing state trial judges).
80. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES AND THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE AMERICA 15 (1992).
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Americans find one reality while African-Americans see
another.""' Today, African-Americans and other minorities are
more likely than white people to be arrested,82  put in
chokeholds,83  denied bail,' denied probation, 5  and given
harsher sentences. 5
The past continues to resonate particularly in the criminal
justice system when the legacy of racial oppression so often
intersects with continued indifference to justice for the poor. The
resistance to Gideon v. Wainwright in many states has resulted
81. Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 663, 665, 437 S.E.2d 463, 468 (1993) (Sears-Collins, J.,
dissenting).
82. See Charles J. Ogletree, Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions?, CHAMPION,
July 1991, at 7, 10-12 (describing discriminatory practices by police against racial
minorities); Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African American Male: Communication Gap
Converts Justice Into "Just Us" System, 13 HARv. BLAcKLETIER J. 1, 5 (1997).
83. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 116 n.3 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that although only 9% of residents of Los Angeles are black males, they have
accounted for 75% of deaths resulting from chokeholds by police).
84. See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail
Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994) (documenting discrimination in the setting of
bail rates for African-Americans); Mary Maxwell Thomas, supra note 82, at 5.
85. Bill Rankin, Unequal Justice: Whites More Apt to Get Probation, ATLANTA J. &
CoNsT., Feb. 8, 1998, at Al (reporting that since 1990 white people convicted in
Georgia were 30% to 60% more likely than blacks to get probation for various crimes
even though prior criminal records were about same among blacks and whites); Keith
W. Watters, Law Without Justice, NAVL B. ASS'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996 at 1, 23
(reporting that whites are more likely to be placed on probation than African-
Americans, and that African-Americans make up only 12% of population and 13% of
drug users, but comprise 55% of drug convictions).
86. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995) (stating, of 375
persons serving life sentences for a second conviction for sale or possession with
intent to distribute certain narcotics, 98.4% are African-Americans); State v. Russell,
477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (finding equal protection violation under state
constitution due to more severe sentences imposed for possession of crack cocaine
than for powdered cocaine when 96.6% of those charged with possession of crack
cocaine are black and 79.6% of those charged with possession of powdered cocaine are
white); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990) (reporting a "remarkably
consistent" pattern of racial disparities in death penalty sentencing throughout
country); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 165 (1991) (arguing that "most disturbing
systemic disparity is the apparent disparate treatment of young, black males, who on
the average receive guidelines sentences significantly longer than those received by
their white counterparts for similar offenses"); see also JEROmE G. MILLER, SEARCH
AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996);
THE REAL WAR ON CRmIE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CONIMISSION (Stephen R. Donziger ed., 1996); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities
in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 781 (1993).
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in representation of indigent defendants that is often a disgrace
and trials that, on some occasions, are no different from the
"legal lynchings" of the 1930s and 1940s.
Many jurisdictions award contracts to provide representation
to indigent defendants to the lawyer who submits the lowest bid,
without any regard to the quality of services provided.87 Many
states pay lawyers appointed to defend the poor such low rates
that attorneys may make less than the minimum wage in some
cases."8 In Virginia, for example, lawyers are limited to $100 for
defending someone in a misdemeanor case in district court, $132
for defending a misdemeanor case in circuit court, $265 for
defending a felony case when the punishment is less than twenty
years, and $575 when punishment is more than twenty years. 9
These fees were set by the legislature, but when state circuit
judges in Henrico County were presented with a challenge to the
limits as interfering with the right to counsel, they removed the
lawyer making the challenge and refused to appoint any lawyer
who would raise the issue."° The challenge was not a frivolous
one. The attorney argued that once he exceeded the limit and
87. See, e.g., Clay Hall, Public Defender is Hired, THOMPSON (GA.) TIMES, Feb. 24,
1993, at 3A (describing how McDuffie County, Georgia, saved $21,000 on amount it
had paid the year before by awarding contract to a lawyer whose bid was almost
$20,000 lower than other two bids).
88. For example, in Alabama, lawyers are paid $20 an hour for out-of-court
preparation up to a limit of $1000 to defend a non-capital case and $2000 to defend
a capital case. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(a) (Supp. 1992); Lawyers can be reimbursed
for their overhead expenses. See May v. State, 672 So.2d 1307 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993). In some rural areas in Texas, lawyers receive no more than $800 to handle a
capital case. See Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel, NAT'L
L.J., June 11, 1990, at 34. Generally, the hourly rate is $50 or less. THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN. TEXAS 157
(1993) (prepared for State Bar of Texas). In Mississippi, lawyers are paid $1000 and
reimbursed for their overhead expenses for defending a capital case. See Wilson v.
State, 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990). In Louisiana, some lawyers are not paid at all.
See State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993) (holding that fees for lawyer's services
need not be paid, but that lawyers were entitled to recover their reasonable out-of-
pocket expenses and overhead costs). Louisiana had previously required the lawyer to
pay all expenses and made no provision for overhead costs. See State v. Clifton, 172
So. 2d 657 (La. 1965).
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (WESTLAW 1998). The statute provides that on
July 1, 1998, lawyers can receive up to $735 in felony cases punishable by more than
20 years, but the other rates remain the same. The statute provides for a "reasonable
amount" for the defense of a capital case. Id.
90. See Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the Cheap, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998 at Al; Felony Murder: Soup to Nuts-$575, CR. PRACTICE REP.,
Jan. 28, 1998, at 25, 27 [hereinafter Felony Murder].
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was forced to work uncompensated, it created a conflict between
his pecuniary interests and his duty to provide zealous
representation." After the challenge had been made, one circuit
judge announced at calendar call that any attorney raising the
conflict of interest issue would be removed from the list of
appointed counsel, and before appointing any lawyer to a case,
the judge asked the attorney whether he or she intended to raise
the issue.2
Judges in Houston, Texas repeatedly appointed a lawyer
known for hurrying through trials like "greased lightening," to
defend indigent defendants in the last forty-five years.93
Houston judges, who have taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel, presided over two capital trials in which the lawyer slept
during trial, and Texas courts upheld the convictions and death
sentences on appeal.94 After the capital defender program in
Texas closed because its federal fumding was eliminated, the
Court of Criminal Appeals appointed two of its former law clerks
to fourteen capital post-conviction cases and paid them
$265,000." The two former clerks had no experience in
representing capital crime defendants." It would be impossible
for even the most experienced lawyers to take on so many cases
and provide adequate representation in all of them.
An Alabama judge presided over a capital case in which the
attorney was so intoxicated that the trial had to be suspended for
a day and the lawyer was sent to jail to sober up. 7 The
Alabama Supreme Court had no hesitation in deciding a capital
91. See Lafay, supra note 90, at Al.
92. See id. at A10 (reporting that Judge James E. Kulp announced that he would
remove any lawyer who raised issue from list of attorneys eligible for court
appointments); Felony Murder, supra note 90, at 27.
93. Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About
System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al.
94. See Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 457 & n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(Maloney, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of clerk of court that "defense counsel
was asleep on several occasions on several days over the course of the proceedings"
and "was asleep for long periods of time during the questioning of witnesses"); David
R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694-95
(1996) (describing case of Carl Johnson, who was executed by Texas even though his
lawyer slept through much of proceedings).
95. See Kathy Walt, Lawyers Who Aid Condemned Paid $265,000, Hou. CHRON.,
Oct. 3, 1997, at A33.
96. See id. at A33, A35.
97. See Bright, supra note 54, at 1835-36 (describing capital trial of Judy Haney).
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case on direct appeal even though the court-appointed lawyer
filed a one-page brief and failed to show up for oral argument.98
A court concerned about justice and the rule of law would have
appointed lawyers to file a proper brief and insisted on oral
argument so that the court could do its job properly in deciding
the case.
It is hard to fathom how judges could preside over trials in
which grossly incompetent attorneys represented the accused,
especially in cases involving the death penalty.99 But the judges
not only tolerated the incompetence; in most instances, they
appointed the lawyers to the case. In doing so, they breached
their constitutional responsibility under Gideon and the Sixth
Amendment.
History lives in other areas as well. In Alabama, state Judge
Roy S. Moore has become "something of a celebrity for fighting,
both in court and in the news, to keep a tablet of the Ten
Commandments hanging behind his bench" despite a court order
to remove it.' After a federal court prohibited state officials
from permitting any officially sanctioned religious activity in the
schools, Judge Moore declared that the federal order was not the
law of Etowah County, where he presides, and constituted an
"unconstitutional abuse of power" by the federal judiciary.'"'
Judge Moore apparently believes that defiance of the law
remains as popular in Alabama today as it was in George
Wallace's time.
B. The Role of the Federal Courts
The progress that has been made in the South to end racial
discrimination in education, voting, housing, public
accommodations, and other areas is largely attributable to the
federal courts and the extraordinary persistence of federal judges
when faced with resistance and outright defiance by the
states.' On the great legal and moral issue of racial equality,
98. See id. at 1860-61 n.154 (setting out in full, one-page brief filed in case of
Larry Gene Heath, whose death sentence was affirmed by Alabama Supreme Court
on basis of brief; Heath was executed); see also id. at 1843 n.55 (describing other
grossly deficient briefs filed in capital cases).
99. See id. at 1862.
100. Kevin Sack, In South, Prayer is a Form of Protest, N.Y. TIMIES, Nov. 8, 1997,
at A7.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); BASS, supra note 40, at 159-60
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the state courts stood in the way of justice instead of ordering
it.
0 3
After the Supreme Court held that schools must be integrated
in Brown v. Board of Education,°4 it was only because a group
of extraordinary men that Jack Bass described as "unlikely
heroes" happened to be on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit that schools in the southern states were integrated after
years of resistance. 5  Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
described the role that the judges of the Fifth Circuit played:
In the 1950's and 1960's, many Southern officials, white
citizens' councils and vigilante groups urged total defiance of
the Federal courts' civil rights decrees. Despite the persistent
hostility, virtually every Fifth Circuit judge-all appointed by
President Eisenhower-repeatedly affirmed the constitutional
rights of black citizens, among them Rosa Parks and Martin
Luther King Jr."6
Courageous federal district judges like Frank Johnson and J.
Skelly Wright repeatedly ordered the states to meet their
constitutional responsibilities to black citizens in education and
other areas. 7 As Judge Johnson once observed:
[Fiederal courts in Alabama-in addition to ordering
hundreds of public schools to desegregate-have ordered the
desegregation of mental institutions, penal facilities, public
parks, city buses, bus terminals, airport terminals, and public
libraries and museums.
(describing necessity for federal court intervention in civil rights cases because of
failure of elected state court judges to enforce constitutional guarantees); see also,
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERIcAN IN THE KING YEAS 1954-63 (1988);
TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FRE: AMERIcAN IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1998).
103. See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights
Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1994) ("Southern state judges were
unmistakably hostile to constitutional claims of African-American litigants.").
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools violates
Equal Protection Clause); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(requiring that desegregation of public schools proceed "with all deliberate speed").
105. BASS, supra note 102.
106. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Breaking Thurgood Marshall's Promise, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Jan. 8, 1998, § 6, at 28, 29.
107. See FRANK SIKORA, THE JUDGE: THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF ALABAMIA'S FRANK
M. JOHNSON, JR. (1992); LIvA BAKER, THE SECOND BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS: THE
HUNDRED-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS (1996) (describing Judge J.
Skelly Wright's role in integration of New Orleans schools); BASS, TAMING THE
STORA, supra note 40.
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Each case stood as a warning to state officials that the limits
of their discretion to proceed at all deliberate speed had long
since been exceeded. Yet, in reckless disregard of these
repeated warnings, the state invested its time and energy in
attempts to circumvent the responsibilities constitutionally
required and spelled out in prior court orders.'
Federal courts also ordered the end to the shameful, barbaric
practices in southern prisons and mental institutions. Those who
today complain about "judicial activism" and "micromanagement"
of prisons by federal courts, fail to mention the practices and
conditions in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and other states
that prompted prisoners to seek protection from the federal
courts: lashing prisoners with leather straps until their skin was
bloody,"9 giving prisoners electrical shocks to sensitive parts of
their body from a hand-cranked device, ° placing as many as
six inmates "in four foot by eight foot cells with no beds, no
lights, no running water, and a hole in the floor for a toilet which
could only be flushed from the outside,""' and crowding
prisoners into barracks where "[h]omosexual rape was so common
and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep;
instead they would leave their beds and spend the night clinging
to the bars nearest the guards' station." "
Mississippi replaced convict leasing with a huge plantation
prison known as Parchman Farm. State judges sentenced
convicts to go to Parchman and did nothing about the conditions
there. A federal lawsuit resulted in an examination of conditions
at the prison by a federal judge, William C. Keady. His visits
were described as follows:
Keady visited Parchman on four occasions, once taking his
minister along. Wandering through the cages, talking
privately to the inmates, he discovered an institution in
108. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGES' J., Spring
1979, at 4, 6.
109. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 n.4 (1978) (describing whipping of
Arkansas prisoners with wooden-handled leather strap five feet long for minor
infractions); OsmINSKY, supra note 2, at 149-51 (describing whipping of prisoners in
Mississippi with three-foot leather strap, known as "Black Annie").
110. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682 n.5 (describing use of 'Tucker telephone").
111. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 327 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified, 559
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam).
112. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681-82 n.3.
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shambles, marked by violence and neglect. The camps were
laced with open ditches, holding raw sewage and medical
waste. Rats scurried along the floors.... At one camp, Keady
found "three wash basins for 80 men which consist of oil
drums cut in half." At all camps, he saw filthy bathrooms,
rotting mattresses, polluted water supplies, and kitchens
overrun with insects, rodents, and the stench of decay.
The convicts told him stories that supported [the claims
made in the suit]. Parchman was a dangerous, deadly place.
Shootings and beatings were common; murders went
unreported; the maximum security unit was a torture
chamber. Trusties brutalized inmates, who, in turn,
brutalized each other. "One part of me had always suspected
such things," the judge recalled. "The rest of me was angry
and ashamed."'
Judge Keady required prison officials to protect inmates from
physical assaults by other inmates, stop housing them in
barracks unfit for human habitation, end racial discrimination
against inmates, provide medical care, and end other barbaric
and patently unconstitutional practices."'
Judge Frank Johnson found in Alabama prisons that violence
was "rampant""5 and "robbery, rape, extortion, theft and
assault [were] everyday occurrences among the general inmate
population.""6 Mentally disturbed inmates were "dispersed
throughout the prison population without receiving
treatment.""' The prisons were "horrendously
overcrowded, ""' and "woefully understaffed."' Inmates in
punitive isolation were placed in a building locked from the
outside with no guard stationed inside, given "only one meal per
day, frequently without utensils," and "were permitted no
exercise or reading material and could shower only every 11
days..1uo
Judge Johnson also found that conditions in Alabama's mental
hospitals, which served only to keep mentally ill people out of
113. See OSHINSKY, supra note 2, at 245.
114. Id. at 246-48; see also Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 881-905 (N.D. Miss.
1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 325.
116. Id. at 324.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 322.
119. Id. at 325.
120. Id. at 327.
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public view by warehousing them, were unconstitutional. 2 He
found, "It]here can be no legal (or moral) justification for the
State of Alabama's failing to afford treatment-and adequate
treatment from a medical standpoint-to the several thousand
patients who have been civilly committed to [the state's mental
hospital] for treatment purposes."'22 Judge Johnson reserved
his ruling to allow state officials the opportunity to promulgate
and implement proper standards, but the State failed to comply,
and Judge Johnson then ordered them to do so." So great was
Alabama's resistance to properly treating its mentally ill, that
the litigation has continued for over twenty-six years and has
produced at least thirty-nine reported decisions." Alabama's
practice of resistance and forcing federal authorities to order
needed reforms occurred with such frequency that Judge Johnson
termed it "The Alabama Punting Syndrome." 5
Unfortunately, abuses in correctional institutions have not
ended. State prisons and jails are again overcrowded as courts
121. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
122. Id. at 785.
123. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
124. See Wyatt v. Rogers, No. CIVA. 3195-N, 1998 WL 13830 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6,
1998); Wyatt v. Rogers, No. CIVA. 3195-N, 1997 WL 784491 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 15,
1997); Wyatt v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1996); Wyatt v. Rogers, 942 F. Supp.
518 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Wyatt v. Poundstone, 941 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Ala. 1996);
Wyatt v. Hanan, 77 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 1996); cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 84 (1996);
Wyatt v. Poundstone, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1995 WL 938444 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 1995);
Wyatt v. Hanan, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1995 WL 699616 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 1995);
Wyatt v. Poundstone, No. CIV. 3195-N, 1995 WL 569121 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 1995);
Wyatt v. Poundstone, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1995 WL 430939 (M.D. Ala. July 11, 1995);
Wyatt v. Poundstone, 892 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Wyatt v. Hanan, 170
F.R.D. 189 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Wyatt v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155 (M.D. Ala. 1995);
Wyatt v. Hanan, 871 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Wyatt v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp.
1356 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Wyatt v. King, 985 F.2d 579 (11th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. King,
811 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ala. 1993); Wyatt v. King, 803 F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Ala.
1992); Wyatt v. King, 793 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Wyatt v. Horsley, 793 F.
Supp. 1053 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Wyatt v. King, No. CIVA 3195-N, 1991 WL 640065
(M.D. Ala. Dec. 17, 1991); Wyatt v. King, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1991 WL 365043 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 28, 1991); Wyatt v. King, 781 F. Supp. 750 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Wyatt v.
Horsley, 773 F. Supp. 1508 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Wyatt v. Wallis, No. CIV.A. 3195-N,
1986 WL 69194 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 1986); Wyatt v. Ireland, 515 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.
Ala. 1981); Wyatt v. Ireland, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1979 WL 48254 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25,
1979); Wyatt v. Ireland, No. CIV.A. 3195-N, 1979 WL 48253 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25,
1979); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
125. Johnson, supra note 108.
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send more people to prison than ever before even as crime rates
decline.'26 The "war on crime" being waged by politicians
competing to show how tough they are has led to a return to
primitive practices and mistreatment of prisoners. 127  For
example, Georgia's commissioner of corrections, an undertaker,
after announcing that "one-third of [state prison] inmates 'ain't
fit to kill, ' 121 fired academic and vocational teachers,
recreation directors and counselors, 9 eliminated hot lunches
for prisoners, 3 ' placed inmates in ninety-day boot camp
programs on a diet of sandwiches and water, 3' and requires
inmates to walk miles a day.3 2 The commissioner also led raids
on the prisons in purported searches for drugs and contraband,
in which unresisting inmates were beaten and degraded.'33 A
lieutenant who heads one of the squads that participated in one
of the raids described the brutal assault on inmates as a "dad-
gum shark frenzy." Another correctional officer described
seeing an unresisting inmate's face shoved into a wall: "Blood
went up the wall. Blood went all over the ground, all over the
126. See Fox Butterfield, 'Defying Gravity," Inmate Population Climbs, N.Y. TZMES,
Jan. 19, 1998, at A10 (reporting that despite decline in crime rate over past five
years, number of inmates has continued to rise each year, that over 1,700,000
inmates are in prisons and jails and that national incarceration rate of 645 inmates
per 100,000 people is more than double rate in 1985).
127. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Taking No Prisoners, In Manner of Speaking, N.Y.
TIAMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at 6 (describing how sheriff in Maricopa County, Arizona
substituted bologna sandwiches for hot lunches, discontinued all movies, banned
cigarettes and coffee, and housed some prisoners in tents); Adam Nossiter, Making
Hard Time Harder, States Cut Jail TV and Sports, N.Y. TIAIES, Sept. 17, 1994, at 1
(describing efforts to take away television and exercise for prisoners in many states);
Rick Bragg, Chain Gangs to Return to Roads of Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995,
at 16 (describing return of chain gangs to Alabama).
128. Rhonda Cook, A Tough Chief of Prisons, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 15, 1996,
at Gi.
129. See Rhonda Cook, 235 Prison Teachers Fired in $8 Million Cost-Cutting Move,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 7, 1996, at Al.
130. See Cook, supra note 128.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Rhonda Cook, Prison Officials Recall Blood Bath, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 17, 1997, at D2 [hereinafter Cook, Blood Bath] (reporting on deposition
testimony by prison officials taken in lawsuit filed in connection with case); Rhonda
Cook, Depositions Detail Abuse of Inmates, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 9, 1997, at
Cl (reporting that latest revelations suggest a system-wide belief that beating
prisoners is acceptable).
134. Rhonda Cook, Guard Recalls Beatings as Payback Time, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
June 29, 1997, at Cl.
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inmate. I heard it. I heard a sickening cracking sound."'35
Prisoners will continue to be treated in this manner unless courts
enforce constitutional protections and provide remedies when
rights are violated.
The federal courts also played an important role in vindicating
constitutional rights that continued to be denied by the state
courts in criminal trials. After Supreme Court decisions
regarding the power of federal courts to hold hearings and review
state court convictions in habeas corpus actions,'36 federal
courts set aside a number of convictions obtained in state courts
in violation of the Constitution. In two recent examples, habeas
corpus relief was granted where constitutional violations may
have resulted in innocent people being sentenced to death.'37
One person was released after eleven years on Louisiana's death
row in February, 1998.18 There are many other cases in which
federal courts granted habeas corpus relief after state courts had
refused to recognize or correct glaring constitutional errors.3 9
135. Cook, Blood Bath, supra note 133 (quoting from deposition of guard Phyllis
Tucker).
136. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
137. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV433-
JCH, Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 2, 1996 (D. Mo. 1996) (granting
habeas relief based on finding that constitutional violation led to conviction of Schlup
even though he was probably innocent); Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
(finding a violation of due process by prosecution due to failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence).
138. See Pamela Coyle, Jubilant Family Welcomes Kyles, TIMES PICAYUNE, Feb. 19,
1998, at Al, A13 (describing release of Curtis Lee Kyles after fourth hung jury on
whether he was guilty of crime; prosecution declined to try case again).
139. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (ordering habeas corpus relief
because prosecutor had secretly directed jury commissioners to under-represent
African-Americans in jury pools); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 952 '(1992) (granting relief in capital case because of racial
discrimination and other constitutional violations); Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575
(11th Cir. 1990) (granting writ when state court failed to hold hearing to establish
petitioner's competency to plead guilty); Horace v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1558 (11th
Cir. 1986) (granting relief because petitioner was mentally incompetent at time of
guilty plea); Jordan v. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265 (11th Cir. 1985) (granting relief when
trial court's failure to allow inquiries to jury panel violated defendant's constitutional
rights to an impartial jury and due process); Grant v. Wainwright, 496 F.2d 1043
(5th Cir. 1974) (granting writ when conviction based on an involuntary confession);
Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965) (granting writ when conviction based on
involuntary confession). Federal courts found constitutional error in 40% of the first
361 capital judgments reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings between the restoration
of the death penalty in 1976 and mid-1991. James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly
Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 541 n.15 (1991); see also Ronald J. Tabak,
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Federal courts had to enforce the Constitution in these and
other areas because the state courts simply were not independent
and did not enforce the law. A Georgia Supreme Court justice
acknowledged that the elected justices of that court may have
overlooked errors, leaving federal courts to remedy them via
habeas corpus, because "[federal judges] have lifetime
appointments. Let them make the hard decisions."10 The
consequences of an unpopular decision by an elected judge is
illustrated by the experience of Alabama Circuit Judge James
Edwin Horton, who, convinced that the "Scottsboro Boys" were
innocent, granted them a new trial in 1933."' Horton was voted
out of office the next year, ending his judicial and political
career.' Horton had encountered no opposition when he ran
for judge four years earlier.13 Horton was replaced on the case
by a judge who railroaded the defendants through trials that
resulted in convictions and death sentences that satisfied
Alabama's voters."' Today, state court judges are haunted not
by the memory of Edwin Horton, but by the more recent
experiences of Rose Bird, James Robertson, Charles Campbell,
Penny White and other judges who have been voted out of office
because of unpopular decisions." 5
But the federal courts no longer play the role described by
Justice Hugo Black as 'havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered,
or because they are.., victims of prejudice and public
excitement.""6 Part of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute Which May
Also be a Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1477 (1996).
140. Katie Wood, Not Just a Rubber Stamp Anymore, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 4.
141. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 262-73.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 273. In the same election that saw Judge Horton voted out of office,
the state's attorney general, who had personally prosecuted the Scottsboro defendants,
was elected lieutenant governor. See id.
144. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 279-302.
145. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?
72 NYU L. REV. 308, 313-15, 331-36 (1997) [hereinafter Political Attacks] (describing
defeat of Penny White); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 Bos. U. L. REv. 759, 760-66 (1995) (describing removal of judges in Texas,
California, and Mississippi).
146. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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Circuit, which once played such a heroic role in ending
segregation, is now the Eleventh Circuit.47 Both courts, now
dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees, have followed the
Supreme Court's retreat from protecting the rights of racial
minorities, the poor and other disadvantaged groups. The Fifth
Circuit has taken the lead in eliminating programs to increase
minority enrollment in education,"4 and restricting the scope of
the Voting Rights Act.14 It gives very short shrift to habeas
corpus cases, even those in which the death penalty has been
imposed, once allowing an execution to be carried out after
spending less than one day to review the first and only appeal of
a condemned person, supposedly reviewing the state court record
in the process.'
The judges of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, have made
clear in overruling decisions of panels of the court, that the court
is no haven for the victims of sexual harassment,15 '
147. The Fifth Circuit now includes Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The Eleventh
Circuit includes Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
148. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
149. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (overruling district court's ruling
that single-district system of electing state trial judges in Texas violated Voting
Rights Act; refusing to remand for entry of a consent decree agreed to by plaintiffs
and Attorney General but opposed by judges; and holding that Texas had a
substantial interest in maintaining linkage between electoral and jurisdictional bases
of its trial court judges); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Roscoe Ind. Sch.
Dist., 123 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding no violation of Voting Rights Act in a
school district's at-large system for electing trustees); Rollins v. Fort Bend Ind. Sch.
Dist., 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that at-large voting system used in school
district did not violate Voting Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment despite history
of racial discrimination in area and fact that only three minority candidates had been
elected in twenty years). But see Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997) (holding that Mississippi district court's
findings that black voters were not politically cohesive, that there was no racial block
voting, and that black voters had just as much opportunity as white voters to
participate in political process and elect candidates of their own choosing were clearly
erroneous).
150. See Gesch v. Johnson, No. 97-7521, 1998 WL 19660 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1998)
(Souter, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
151. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (holding suit based on school officials' failure to remedy students' sexual
harassment of student did not state a claim), overruling, 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.
1996). The dissent noted that the majority opinion held that "no matter how
egregious-or even criminal-the harassing discriminatory conduct may be, and no
matter how cognizant of it supervisors may become-a teacher could observe it
directly and regularly-there would be no obligation- to take any action to prevent it
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discrimination because of sexual orientation,'52 or those who
received incompetent representation at capital trials."3 The
court had previously shown it was not a haven for refugees, 54
or African-Americans seeking meaningful participation in
elections under the Voting Rights Act.'55 The court has also
frequently found those accused of racial discrimination or other
constitutional violations to be immune from suit.5 '
under the very law which was passed to eliminate sexual discrimination in our public
schools." Id. at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
152. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (holding that
Georgia Attorney General's withdrawal of offer of employment because of prospective
employee's lesbian marriage did not violate prospective employee's right of
association), overruling 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995).
153. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that defense
counsel's presentation of damaging evidence and failure to present mitigating evidence
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel), overruling 979 F.2d 1473 (11th
Cir. 1992).
154. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding
Haitian refugees interdicted on high seas had no right to judicial review over a
dissent that argued that majority accepted "a pure legal fiction when it holds that
these refugees are in a different class from every other 'excludable alien' "); Borden v.
Meese, 803 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's grant of release to
alien from federal penitentiary); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986)
(reversing district court and holding that Cuban refugees who came to United States
on Mariel boatlift were not entitled to parole revocation hearings); Perez-Perez v.
Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing district court and holding that
Cuban detainees were not entitled to counsel and had not exhausted administrative
remedies); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversing district
court and holding that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take any action
with regard to Cuban refugees' eligibility for asylum on basis of newly presented
evidence when they had not exhausted their administrative remedies).
155. See, e.g., White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
settlement that resulted in increasing number of minority judges on appellate courts
in Alabama); Johnson v. DeSoto County Bd. of Comm'r, 72 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. 1996)
(reversing decision of district court that electing school board members through an at-
large voting scheme violated the Voting Rights Act); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding that Florida's interest in maintaining its judicial
election scheme precluded implementation of remedies for the dilution of the black
vote in judicial elections), overruling 1 F.3d 1171, cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
156. See, e.g., Mencer v. Hammonds, 134 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing
district court and finding qualified immunity for Board of Education and
Superintendent of Schools after they were sued for discrimination on basis of race
and gender in failing to appoint a teacher principal of an elementary school); Woods
v. Gamel, 132 F.3d 1417 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court and finding
absolute legislative immunity for county commissioners sued for jail conditions);
Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing district
court and finding qualified immunity for claims made under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
but not § 1985 for fire department officials sued for race discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation); Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing
district court and finding qualified immunity for police officers sued by an arrestee).
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Members of Congress, ignoring history, have created and
-exploited resentment of the federal courts for enforcing the
Constitution in cases involving prisoners and vindicating
constitutional rights through habeas corpus. They have enacted
legislation restricting the power of the federal courts. Those most
in need of the protections of the Bill of Rights-the poor, racial
minorities, and the mentally ill-have no political action
committee or access to legislators or governors to remind
legislators of this history or to lobby against this return to states'
rights.
In the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress stripped the
federal courts of much of their power to remedy unconstitutional
conditions or practices in prisons and jails.5 ' Congress also has
prohibited legal services programs from representing prisoners in
any kind of case, 5 ' and limited the attorney fees recoverable in
a successful prison suit to discourage lawyers in private practice
from taking those cases.'59 Even before Congress acted, the
Supreme Court had made it very difficult for inmates to prevail
in challenges to cruel and inhuman conditions and, as a result,
all sorts of abuses and degradation have been found not to violate
the Constitution. 60
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199661
placed new, unprecedented restrictions on the power of the
federal courts to vindicate, in habeas corpus cases, the
157. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 802-803 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996) and other statutes); Kristin L. Burns, Return to Hard Time:
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 GA. L. REV. 879 (1997).
158. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 4504(a)(15), 110 Stat. 1312.
159. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d) (1996)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996)).
160. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that denial of
exercise may be a constitutional violation only when inmate's muscles atrophy or if
inmate's health is threatened); Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting claims of paraplegic inmate that he was denied wheelchair, physical therapy
sessions, exercise, recreation, hygienic care, and medical care because of inability to
meet the Supreme Courts standard of "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison
officials); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, (4th Cir. 1995) (holding refusal to allow
prisoner to take shower for three days after human excrement and urine were thrown
on him by other inmates did not violate Eighth Amendment when inmate was
provided with "water and cleaning materials" to clean himself and cell); Hedieh
Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CuOm. L. REV. 1173,
1188-99 (1996-97).
161. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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constitutional rights of people convicted in state courts.'62 Even
before passage of the Act, the Supreme Court adopted and,
rigorously enforced strict rules of procedural default,"3
excluded Fourth Amendment claims from habeas corpus
review,"M made it more difficult for a habeas petitioner to
obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a constitutional
violation,6 ' adopted an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding
the retroactivity of constitutional decisions,' reduced the
burden on the states to establish harmless error once a
constitutional violation was found,'67 and erected barriers to the
filing of a second habeas petition.6 '
This diminished role of the federal courts ushers in a new era
of states' rights. States are free to revert to practices that existed
before federal court intervention or to take on the responsibility
of enforcing the law equally for all citizens. In order to prevent a
return to the discrimination and human rights abuses of the
past, achieving independent state courts that will base their
decisions on the law, not political expediency, is a matter of great
urgency.
II. OVERCOMING ELECTIONS
.Judges are not independent when they are beholden to special
interest groups that finance their elections or know that an
162. The Act established a one-year statute of limitations of general applicability, see
id. §§ 101, 105 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996)), and a statute of limitations
of 180 days for states which meet certain standards of providing counsel in capital
post-conviction proceedings, see id. § 107 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (1996)). It
prohibits federal courts from granting habeas corpus relief unless the decision of the
state court "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law," id. § 104(3)(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996));
severely limits when a federal court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, see id. §
104(4) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(3)(2) (1996)); and prohibits second or "successive"
petitions for habeas corpus relief except in very narrow circumstances. See id. §§ 105,
106 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2244(b) (1996)).
163. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489
U.S. 401 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-36 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977); Timothy J.
Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in
Capital Cases, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1989).
164. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
165. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
166. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Liebman, supra note 139.
167. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
168. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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unpopular decision in the case before them may cost them their
jobs. The rule of law is not served when judges must violate the
Code of Judicial Conduct by promising certain results in order to
get elected or stay on the bench.' s
The rapidly growing role of special interest groups-from oil
and tobacco companies, the insurance defense bar, prosecutors,
and the religious right, to labor unions, the plaintiffs personal
injury bar and other litigants-seeking to secure the election of
judges who will decide in their favor has been documented
elsewhere,7 0 as have the enormous political pressures placed on
elected judges due to the threat of being voted out of office for
unpopular decisions. 7'
Everyone who cares about judicial independence and the rule
of law should be alarmed when the president of a large state's
bar comments, "[t]he people with money to spend who are
affected by Court decisions have reached the conclusion that it's
a lot cheaper to buy a judge than a governor or an entire
169. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5A(3)(d)(i), (ii) (1990) (stating a
judge "shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court").
170. See John Cornyn, Ruminations on the Nature of Texas Judging, 25 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 367, 378 (1993). Cornyn, a justice of the Texas Supreme Court, states that "[tihe
gravest concern that inheres in the elective system . . .is that judicial candidates are
compelled to raise campaign funds: money and judges simply do not mix." See also
Orrin W. Johnson & Laura Johnson Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gathering
Storm?, 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 525, 545-52 (1992) (discussing rising campaign costs in
Texas judicial elections); Sheila Kaplan & Zod Davidson, The Buying of the Bench,
NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11 (describing amounts spend for judicial races around
country); Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections:
Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2
MICH. L. & POLY REv. 71, 76 (1997) (noting that contributions by lawyers and their
law firms represent largest share of contributions to judicial elections and that these
contributions understandably create the perception that attorneys who practice before
a judge by day are same attorneys who host expensive fundraisers for them by
night); Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards and Independent, Fair, and Competent
Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
839, 840 (1994) (arguing that judicial elections, due to their requirements of political
and financial support, erode "public's confidence in an independent judiciary and put
jurists in an ethically compromising position"); Gerald F. Uelman, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in the Era of
Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1151-54 (1997) (describing
campaigns in Ohio, Kentucky, and Texas).
171. See Uelman, supra note 170, at 1133 (describing judges who must face an
election to keep their jobs as "tadpole[s] in a pond full of crocodiles"); Bright, Political
Attacks, supra note 145; Bright & Keenan, supra note 145.
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:817
legislature and [the judge] can probably do a lot more for
you."72 The comment was made after a candidate spent $1
million to defeat the incumbent Chief Justice of Ohio who spent
$1.7 million. The newly-elected chief justice then voted to rehear
thirty cases that had been decided in the final weeks of the
incumbent's term.73 Equally disturbing is the comment made
by the director of the Christian Coalition of Florida that judicial
elections are the next "hot-button" issue for his group. 74 The
"buying" of judges by special interest groups is not consistent
with judicial independence.
The impact of race, politics and judicial elections on judicial
decisionmaking is illustrated by the Georgia Supreme Court's
about face in a case involving gross racial disparities in
sentencing for drug offenses. 75 The court first held by a four-to-
three vote that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was
established by evidence that 98.4% of those serving sentences of
life imprisonment for certain narcotics offenses were black.
Statistics from the Georgia Department of Corrections
established that less than one percent of the whites eligible for
life sentences for narcotics offenses-just one in 168-received a
life sentence, while 16.6% of African-Americans-202 of
1219-received a life sentence. 76
However, just thirteen days after finding that these
remarkable disparities raised a question of racial discrimination,
the court reversed itself 77 in response to a petition for
rehearing filed by the Attorney General of Georgia and all the
forty-six district attorneys in the state, arguing that the court's
decision took a "substantial step toward invalidating" the state's
death penalty law and would "paralyze the criminal justice
system."78 One justice changed his vote and the court held that
the racial disparities did not even raise a question of
discrimination.
172. Uelman, supra note 170, at 1151 (quoting Robert Kaplan, Justice for Sale,
COMMiON CAUSE MAG., May-June, 1987, at 29-30).
173. See id.
174. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 170.
175. See Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995).
176. See id. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
177. See Emily Heller, Stevens v. State: Second Thoughts on Second-Offense Law,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 3, 1995, at 1, 10.
178. Emily Heller, Racial Test Put to the Test, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar.
30, 1995, at 1, 4.
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Two recent examples show the dangers posed to judicial
independence by both direct elections and retention elections. In
Texas, candidates for judicial office run with a political party
affiliation. In 1994, a former chairman of the state Republican
Party called for Republicans to take over the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals after the court reversed the conviction in a
capital case.'79 Stephen W. Mansfield ran as the Republican
candidate against the author of the decision, a conservative
former prosecutor, Charles Campbell, who had served twelve
years on the court and had been supported by both sides of the
criminal bar.8 ' Mansfield ran on promises of greater use of the
death penalty, greater use of the harmless-error doctrine, and
sanctions for attorneys who file "frivolous appeals especially in
death penalty cases." 8' Before the election, it came to light that
Mansfield had misrepresented his prior background, experience,
and record,'82 that he had been fined for practicing law without
a license in Florida," and that--contrary to his assertions that
he had experience in criminal cases and had "written extensively
on criminal and civil justice issues'-he had virtually no
experience in criminal law.' Nevertheless, Mansfield received
fifty-four percent of the votes and now sits on the Court.'85
After his election, the Texas Lawyer declared Mansfield an
"unqualified success.
" 186
Retention elections provide no greater guarantee of judicial
independence. Justice Penny White was voted off the Tennessee
Supreme Court in a retention election after a surprise attack
shortly before the election by the Republican Party and right-
wing groups. The attack was based primarily on a single case,
179. See Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His
Past Isn't What it Seems, TEX. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1, 32.
180. See Jane Elliott, Unqualified Success: Mansfield's Mandate; Vote Makes a Case
for Merit Selection, TEX. LAW., Nov. 14, 1994, at 1.
181. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 179.
182. See id.; Elliot, supra note 180, at 1 (reporting that Mansfield was unable to.
verify campaign claims regarding number of criminal cases he had handled and had
portrayed himself as political novice despite having twice unsuccessfully run for
Congress); see also Do It Now, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 12, 1994, at 32
(editorial calling for an immediate challenge to Mansfield's election because he had
"shaded the truth of virtually every aspect of his career").
183. John Williams, Election '94: GOP Gains Majority in State Supreme Court,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at A29.
184. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 179, at 32.
185. See Elliot, supra note 180, at 1.
186. Id.
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State v. Odum,87 the only capital case decided by the court
during Justice White's nineteen-month tenure on the court.
Justice White did not write the majority opinion, a concurring
opinion or a dissenting opinion in the case. Odum's death
sentence was reversed and the case was remanded for a new
sentencing hearing because all five members of the Tennessee
Supreme Court agreed that there had been at least one legal
error which required a new sentencing hearing. 8'
However, Tennessee voters were told that Justice White had
personally overturned the conviction in the case,"9 even though
the conviction was upheld and the sentence was reversed by the
entire court. Voters were also given a graphic description of
Odum's crime and told than Odum "won't be getting the
punishment that he deserves[ t]hanks to Penny White,"90 even
though the entire court remanded the case for a new sentencing
trial at which Odum could well be sentenced to death again or
life imprisonment. Voters were also told than unless they voted
White off the bench, she would "free more and more criminals
and laugh at their victims."'' Justice White was unable to
respond to these distortions of Odum before the election because
a motion for rehearing was pending in the case until the election
and the Canons of Judicial Conduct prohibited her from
commenting on a pending case.
Tennessee's governor and both its United States Senators, all
Republicans, opposed the retention of Justice White.' The
Republican Party mailed a brochure to voters titled, "Just Say
NO!" with the slogan, "Vote for Capital Punishment by Voting
NO on August 1 for Supreme Court Justice Penny White."'93
187. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).
188. In an opinion by Justice Birch three members of the court held that there were
three errors requiring reversal. See id. at 32-33. The remaining two members of the
court concurred with regard to one error, but dissented with regard to the other two.
See id. at 33 (Anderson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See Letter to Voters by John M. Davies, President of the Tennessee
Conservative Union, at 2, in Bright, Political Attacks, supra note 145, at 331-34
(reproducing letter in full). The letter twice says that the conviction was overturned.
See id. at 332.
190. Id. at 331.
191. Id. at 332.
192. See Jeff Woods, Public Outrage Nails a Judge, NASHVILLE BANNER, Aug. 2,
1996, at Al, A2 (reporting that Gov. Sundquist and Sens. Fred Thompson and Bill
Frist all announced their opposition to White); Jeff Woods, Sundquist Admits Early
Ballot to Boot White, NASHVILLE BANNER, July 26, 1996, at B2 (reporting that
"White's foes are casting the election as a referendum on the death penalty").
193. Bright, Political Attacks, supra note 145, at 335-36 (reproducing brochure in
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Immediately after the retention election, the Governor of
Tennessee, Don Sundquist, said: "Should a judge look over his
shoulder [in making decisions] about whether they're going to be
thrown out of office? I hope so."' 94 Another justice, who had
been targeted for defeat by the groups that opposed White,
announced that he would not seek to stay on the court in
retention elections in 1998.195
The campaigns waged to win a seat on the bench often produce
judges whose independence and impartiality are subject to
question by any observer and certainly by litigants who come
before the courts. For example, in his campaign for reelection to
the Nevada Supreme Court, Justice Cliff Young "formed a highly-
visible political alliance with the State's attorney general, who in
numerous campaign advertisements publicly 'urged all Nevadans'
to vote for Justice Young."' 96 Justice Young ran campaign
advertisements proclaiming that he had a "record of fighting
crime" which included voting to uphold the death penalty
seventy-six times.'97 Young was reelected. A condemned man
whose case came before the court moved to recuse Judge Young
because the state was represented by the attorney general.
During the pendency of the case, Justice Young had "repeatedly
published his appreciation for the attorney general's support and
how much he 'welcomed' her support.., because of the attorney
general's 'role as the State's top law enforcement officer.' 9'
Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court denied the motion to
disqualify Justice Young.' 99 Justice Springer dissented saying:
"Tough on crime" claims made by judges in election
campaigns are so common in Nevada as to go almost
unnoticed. Our judicial discipline authorities customarily
ignore this kind of judicial misconduct once the judge
becomes elected or reelected. It goes beyond "tough on crime"
full).
194. Paula Wade, White's Defeat Poses Legal Dilemma; How is a Replacement Justice
Picked?, MEMPi s COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1996, at Al.
195. See Tom Humphrey, Justice Will Not Seek New Term, KNOXVILLE NEWS-
SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 1997, at A6 (reporting that Justice Lyle Reid, "listed as a top
target of some who worked for the 1996 ouster of former Supreme Court Justice
Penny White," announced that he would not seek another eight-year term).
196. Nevius v. Warden, 944 P.2d 858, 860 (1997) (Springer, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied with opinion, 1998 WL 341017 (Nev. 1998).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 859.
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for a judge to claim that he is a "crime fighter," especially
when, on top of this, the judge identifies his principal election
supporter as being the State's attorney general. Judges are
supposed to be judging crime not fighting it.'
A Missouri trial judge who was seeking reelection issued a
press release announcing his decision to switch parties from
Democrat to Republican just six days before the capital trial of
Brian Kinder, an indigent African-American."' The press
release stated:
The truth is that I have noticed in recent years that the
Democrat party places far too much emphasis on
representing minorities such as homosexuals, people who
don't want to work, and people with a skin that's any color
but white. Their reverse-discriminatory quotas and
affirmative action, in the work place as well as in schools and
colleges, are repugnant to me .... I believe that a person
should be advanced and promoted, in this life, on the basis of
initiative, qualifications, and willingness to work, not simply
on the color of his or her skin, or sexual preference.
While minorities need to be represented, or [sic] course, I
believe the time has come for us to place much more
emphasis and concern on the hard-working taxpayers in this
country.... That majority group of our citizens seems to
have been virtually forgotten by the Democrat party. 2'
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the judge's refusal to
disqualify himself from the case.03 Justice White, the only
African-American on the Court, dissented saying:
The slur is not ambiguous or complex (nor, unfortunately,
original): "While minorities need to be represented..., I
believe the time has come for us to place much more
emphasis and concern on the hard-working taxpayers in this
country... ." No honest reading of this sentence can show
that it says anything other .than what it says: that minorities
are not hard-working taxpayers.... The mere fact that a
judge who issues a racially derogatory press release a week
later claims to treat equally people who are "white, black,
200. Id. at 860 (Springer, J., dissenting).
201. See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 149
(1997).
202. Id. at 340 (White, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 321.
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red, yellow, or whatever," hardly "set[s] to rest any concern"
about his impartiality. I would feel much more comfortable
with the judge's decision not to recuse if he had used his
press release to trumpet his "prejudice toward upholding
each individual's constitutional rights[,]" rather than filling it
with race-baiting nonsense."
The influence of political pressures on the decisions of elected
judges in high profile cases, such as death penalty cases, is
undeniable. The American Bar Association's Commission on
Professionalism found that "judges are far less likely to...
take... tough action if they must run for reelection or retention
every few years.""' Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens
has pointed out that in states that allow judges to override jury
sentences in capital cases, judges frequently override sentences of
life imprisonment and impose death, but seldom override death
sentences.0 He observed that:
[E]lected judges too often appear to listen [to] the many
voters who generally favor capital punishment but who have
far less information about a particular trial than the jurors
who have sifted patiently through the details of the relevant
and admissible evidence. How else do we account for the
disturbing propensity of elected judges to impose the death
sentence time after time notwithstanding a jury's
recommendation of life?
20 7
In Harris v. Alabama, Justice Stevens warned:
The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges
may be "too responsive" is a political climate in which judges
who covet higher office--or who merely wish to remain
judges-must constantly profess their fealty to the death
penalty .... The danger that they will bend to political
pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized
capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges
beholden to King George M11.2"'
204. Id. at 340 (White, J., dissenting).
205. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM (1986).
206. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 713 n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that juries make decisions based on community values more reliably
than judges because juries more accurately reflect composition and experiences of a
community as a whole).
207. Walton, 497 U.S. at 713 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. at 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
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The independence and impartiality of judges is also called into
question when they preside over cases in which a party or lawyer
has contributed to the judge's campaign."9 The perceived
results of such interest-group domination over judicial elections
were described by one observer as follows:
The Texas Supreme Court in a virtuoso performance of
judicial activism has, in recent years, ignored precedent,
invalidated on Texas constitutional grounds long-accepted
legislative enactments, interpreted Texas statutes so as to
render them meaningless, and glossed over and
misinterpreted fact findings of trial courts, all in pursuit of
desired results.
Case by case results-oriented decisions have replaced the
rule of law.21
This is no way to run a system of justice. Judicial elections,
whether direct elections or retention elections, discourage good
lawyers from becoming judges and result in untenable pressures
on judges once in office to ignore the law and satisfy their
financial supporters or public sentiment to avoid being voted out
of office.
III. OVERCOMING MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE
ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Misperceptions about the judicial role are a major barrier to
attaining an independent judiciary that makes decisions based on
the law. Because of the increasing dominance of special interest
groups in judicial elections, the promises that the selection or
removal of particular judges will produce certain results, and the
attacks made on both the state and federal judiciary, many
citizens perceive judges as no different from other politicians who
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
209. See, e.g., Collier v. Griffith, 1992 WL 44893, *6-*7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding trial judge should have recused himself in case in which one party's attorney
was the finance chairman for the judge's ongoing election campaign); Robert F. Utter,
Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REV. 839, 843-45 (1973)
(observing that lawyers who support victors or losers in political campaign
subsequently have reason to question legitimacy of judgments made by judges).
210. Robert D'Agostino, The Decline of the Law in the Texas Supreme Court, 2
BENCHMARK 171, 171 (1986). See generally Stephen J. Adler, The Texas Bench:
Anything Goes, Aavi. LAW., Apr. 1986, at 11.
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make decisions heavily influenced by the wishes of their
constituents or, more likely in today's world, the major
contributors to their campaigns. However, judges, unlike
legislators or governors, are not expected to gauge public opinion
before making their decisions.
There are few voices reminding citizens of the role of judges
described by Judge William Cranch as interpreting and applying
the law "undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude.""' Those
voices are being drowned out by others urging that judges who do
not heed the clamor of the multitude should be removed from
office either in elections or by impeachment."u
Few point out the importance of the rule of law. Particularly
disturbing is the denigration of the Bill of Rights by politicians as
nothing more than a collection of technicalities that frustrate a
whole range of popular activities from prayer in schools to
convicting and executing criminals. People need to be reminded
of the importance of the Bill of Rights in protecting the
individual from the government, as described by Justice Robert
Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.21
However, Alabama Governor Fob James argued to a federal
judge as recently as 1997 that the Bill of Rights did not apply in
Alabama. 4 While as a matter of law this should not be true,
all too often the Bill of Rights does not apply to the citizens of
Alabama who most need its protections because they either have
no access to the courts or the state courts will not enforce the Bill
of Rights and the federal courts will do nothing to protect their
rights.
211. 1 CHARLEs WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 303
(1947).
212. See Bright, Political Attacks, supra note 145.
213. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
214. See Sack, supra note 100, at A7.
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Governor James has also said that the state legislature and
governor should be able to override decisions of his state's
highest court215 and, on the federal level, that the President
and Congress should simply ignore court decisions they believe
are wrong.216  Former judge and rejected Supreme Court
nominee Robert Bork has proposed that Congress should be given
the power to override court decisions.1 7
Others also suggest that judges should be compliant to the will
of the majority and not let the law get in their way. Presidential
candidates and members of Congress tell the public that federal
judges should be impeached for unpopular decisions."' The
politicians who criticized federal judge Harold Baer for
suppressing cocaine evidence, later bragged when he reversed
himself 9 that "they bullied federal judge Harold Baer into
reversing his controversial ruling ... ."220
Right wing groups in Tennessee, emboldened by their
successful campaign to oust Justice Penny White from the state
supreme court, set their sights on federal district judge John
Nixon, urging his impeachment because he granted habeas
corpus relief in several capital cases. 22' They collected over
215. See Adam Cohen, A Governor With a Mission, TIME, Sept. 4, 1995, at 32
(reporting that James had introduced bill that would allow legislature and governor
to overturn rulings of Alabama Supreme Court from which three or more judges
dissent); James Pushes Restructuring of State's Judicial Branch, COLUMBUS [GA.]
LEDGER-ENQUIRER, May 3, 1995, at B2 (describing proposal and reporting that Gov.
James "sees Alabama judges acting like schoolyard bullies").
216. See James: President, Congress Should Ignore Supreme Court, COLUMBUS
LEDGER-ENQUIRER, June 17, 1996, at B2; James Apologizes for Kowtowing to
Judiciary, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Aug. 12, 1995, at B2.
217. See ROBERT H. BORE, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH. MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996).
218. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues; Clinton Move in New
York Case Imperils Judicial Independence, Bar Leaders Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1996, at Al (reporting that federal judge Harold Baer had been criticized by the
White House, Presidential candidate Robert Dole and other politicians for suppressing
cocaine in a case); Don Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend A Colleague From Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at B1, B4 (reporting that "[o]n the Presidential campaign
trail in California on Saturday, Senator Dole called for Judge Baer's impeachment").
219. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that police
officers had "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity sufficient to support their stop
of defendant), vacating 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that cocaine and
heroin was seized in violation of Fourth Amendment).
220. Paul M. Barrett, Dole Campaign May be on Shaky Ground in Bid to Brand
Another Clinton Judge as Soft on Crime, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1996, at A16.
221. See Kirk Loggins, Law on His Side Against Impeachment, They Say,
TENNESSEAN, May 25, 1997, at 1A.
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27,000 signatures on petitions urging impeachment.222 The
Tennessee Senate passed a resolution by a vote of twenty-eight to
five, urging the United States Congress to begin impeachment
proceedings against Nixon.2 2  The state House of
Representatives voted eighty-seven to eight in favor of a
resolution calling for Nixon not to hear any more death cases.224
However, Judge Nixon's decisions in capital cases have been
upheld by the Court of Appeals.225 As one Tennessee lawyer
noted, "If the 6th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals says that Judge
Nixon is right... do we then impeach those three judges?... At
what point do you stop this?"226
The attacks on judges to remove them from office for
unpopular rulings make no allowance for the fact that judges are
circumscribed in their decisions by the law. Instead, they suggest
to the public that a judicial ruling is no different than a vote by a
legislator. Attacks on judges almost never deal with the legal
basis for their ruling, but are based entirely on the facts of the
crime and the result, such as whether a death sentence was
upheld or reversed. Often there is not even the recognition that
the defendant will be tried again and is still subject to the same
punishment. Instead, the public is led to believe that the judge
let a murderer go free. The results are perceptions and
expectations on the part of voters, which put even greater
pressures on state court judges to avoid unpopular decisions in
order to stay in office.
IV. SHALL WE OVERCOME?
Any honest assessment of the situation must recognize that
the prospects for obtaining judicial independence in the states of
222. See id.
223. See Paula Wade, Impeach Nixon, Senate Urges, MEMPHIS COm. APPEAL, May 20,
1997, at A7 (reporting on Tennessee Senate resolution calling for Judge Nixon's
impeachment).
224. Loggins, supra note 221.
225. See, e.g., Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding Nixon's
grant of relief because counsel's repeated expressions of hostility to petitioner
amounted to constructive denial of his right to assistance of counsel); Groseclose v.
Bell, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding Nixon's ruling that trial counsel's
ineffectiveness warranted habeas corpus relief); Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.
1997) (upholding Nixon's grant of relief because trial counsel ineffective during the
penalty phase); Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding Nixon's
grant of relief because "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" jury instruction was
unconstitutionally vague and uninformative).
226. Loggins, supra note 221.
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the Old Confederacy are not good. There are many indicators
from the symbolic to the substantive that many state judges are
not independent and committed to the rule of law.
An Alabama judge makes a public spectacle of displaying the
Ten Commandments in his courtroom and defying a federal court
order regarding prayer in schools. Georgia judges display the
Confederate battle flag, part of the state's flag, in their
courtrooms, even though the flag represents racial oppression
and defiance of the law to some of the citizens who come before
the courts.
State court judges continue to tolerate indigent defense
systems which are a disgrace to the legal profession and their
states. Such systems cannot possibly assure fairness to the
thousands of people-mostly black and mostly poor-processed
through the criminal courts. Nor can they assure that judges
make informed decisions in imposing sentences, which range
from probation to prison to death. Many state court judges still
dispose of capital and other important cases by signing off on
one-sided orders prepared by state attorneys. 7 State courts
still fail in too many instances to protect racial minorities from
discrimination and to protect the rights of poor people accused of
crimes. No one seriously thinks that state courts in the South
will correct constitutional violations in the prisons, jails and
juvenile facilities in the region. State court judges show little
concern for the fact that increasingly only the wealthy have
meaningful access to the courts.
Indeed, there is a strong possibility that things will get worse.
Judicial decisions are becoming the new "hot button" issues for
politicians and special interest groups who will distort both the
facts and the role of courts to advance their goals. The amounts
spent on judicial elections are escalating at an alarming rate.
Only the most naive doubt that the purpose and effect of this
spending is to influence judicial decisionmaking. There is grave
danger that the number of people of color in the legal profession
will be reduced rather than increased in the future as law schools
deny admission to minority applicants."8 Nevertheless, there is
tremendous resistance to replacing elections with a different
227. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 145, at 803-11.
228. See Higginbotham, supra note 106, at 28, 29 (documenting decline in minority
enrollment at law schools in wake of Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hopwood v. State of
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)).
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system of judicial selection and to taking affirmative steps to
include in the system of justice those who have been traditionally
excluded.
It is remarkable that, in light of these developments, so little
concern has been shown by those who should care greatly about
the independence of the judiciary, including members of the legal
profession. States will develop an independent judiciary and
adherence to the rule of law only if responsible leaders realize
the urgency of the situation, come forward, and speak over the
clamor of those who mislead the public about the judicial role.
They must educate the public about the role of the courts and the
importance of an independent judiciary, and secure the adoption
of new selection procedures that insulate judges from the
influence of money and other improper pressures. Many of those
leaders will not be lawyers, but lawyers, as trustees of our
system of justice, have a special role to play in educating leaders
and the public about the proper role of the judiciary.
It will be possible to overcome history only when we
acknowledge it and its influence on the present. As Justice
William Brennan observed:
[I]t has been scarcely a generation since this Court's first
decision striking down racial segregation, and barely two
decades since the legislative prohibition of racial
discrimination in major domains of national life. These have
been honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that in three
decades we have completely escaped the grip of a historical
legacy spanning centuries.... [We remain imprisoned by
the past as long as we deny its influence in the present.229
Ignoring the past and engaging in wishful thinking that the state
courts are independent will not make independence a reality.
Citizens, judges, lawyers, and public officials must recognize the
lack of independence, acknowledge the historic role the courts
have played in defiance of the law, explore the influence of that
history on the present, and realize how far the courts have to go
to reach independence. States must take major, serious
steps-not minor, token gestures-to increase the participation in
the justice system of racial minorities who have been historically
excluded as judges, jurors, and attorneys. As the population of
the United States becomes more diverse, courts should reflect
229. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that diversity if they are to understand and provide equal justice
to all who come before them.
Conscientious state court judges must begin a process of
serious self examination in response to the new responsibilities
they have as a result of the diminished role of the federal courts
in protecting individual rights. They must ask themselves to
what extent they have been influenced, even subconsciously, in
making their decisions by the need for public approval to stay in
office,' ° and whether that influence is compatible with their
constitutional responsibilities as judges. Are they politicians or
judges? Do they base their decisions on what will get them
elected or the dictates of Supreme Court opinions, which may, in
a particular case, be very unpopular?
State court judges must also question whether they should
continue long-standing practices. For example, should
appointments to defend poor people accused of crimes continue to
be the source of employment of last resort for lawyers who cannot
do anything else? Should judges, who are supposed to be fair and
impartial referees, even be appointing lawyers to defend the
poor? Should judges and prosecutors continue to work as a team,
as occurs in so many jurisdictions today? Should judges delegate
writing of orders to lawyers for the state and then rubber stamp
those orders without even reading them? Should the judge be
independent of the lawyers for both sides?
To overcome misperceptions about the role of the judiciary
which are a major barrier to reform, the bar and other leaders
must engage in public education efforts with a seriousness that
has been lacking thus far. This task is not insurmountable. Most
people want the protections of the law for themselves, but they
have been convinced by those calling for an all-out war on crime
that constitutional protections should not apply to those accused
of crimesY It should not be impossible to convince people that
laws which are applied only when convenient protect no one and
that judges must be independent in order to enforce the laws.
230. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988)
(discussion by Grodin, a former justice of the California Supreme Court, about
whether votes of justices in critical cases may have been subconsciously influenced by
the awareness that the outcomes could affect upcoming judicial elections and his
efforts to assure himself that his vote had been entirely on the merits of the case).
231. See Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft
on Crime," But Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479 (1995).
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But prominent members of the legal profession, who have the
wealth and power to be heard, must take time off from the
relentless pursuit of money, get off the golf courses and out of the
skyboxes and take up these efforts.
Educating the public about the role of the judiciary is essential
to replacing judicial elections with merit selection systems.
Candidates for a judicial position should be nominated on the
basis of qualifications by a committee chosen to assure diverse
citizen input and not controlled by any one person or political
party. The District of Columbia, Hawaii, and other jurisdictions
have such systems that serve as models."a These systems foster
judicial independence by isolating judges from political pressures.
Judicial tenure commissions should periodically review the
performance of judges to decide whether they should be
reappointed.
Neither retention elections nor allowing judges to respond to
attacks will produce an independent judiciary. Retention
elections have the same potential for intimidation and a chilling
effect on judicial decisionmaking as direct elections, as
demonstrated by the removal of Justice White from the
Tennessee Supreme Court and Governor Sundquist's comment
afterwards that judges should be looking over their shoulder in
making decisions. Allowing judges to respond to attacks only
creates the questions of impartiality that arose in Nevada when
Justice Young, "responding to an assertion, based on one case,
that he was soft on the death penalty,"23 campaigned as a
crime fighter who had affirmed seventy-six capital cases.
Does a merit selection system completely eliminate politics and
always produce perfect judges and perfect decisionmaking? Of
course not. No system can do that. Any selection process, from
awarding the Nobel prize to the selection of the Pope by the
College of Cardinals, involves some politics. And, unfortunately,
some individuals, no matter how selected, will bring to the bench
232. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1501 to 11-1502 (1995) (President selects judges
from names that a commission recommends, with advice and consent of the Senate,
for 15-year terms; judicial qualification commission reviews performance); HAW.
CONST. art. VI, § 3 (governor appoints judges, from a judicial selection commission's
list of nominees and with consent of the senate, for 10-year terms; judicial selection
commission determines retention). For further discussion of desirable features of merit
selection systems, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 145, at 817-21.
233. Nevius v. Warden, 944 P.2d 858, 859 (1997), reh'g denied with opinion, 1998
WL 341017 (Nev. 1998).
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an agenda or become arrogant, self righteous, erratic,
overbearing, and rude upon becoming judges. That is why a
system of periodic review by a judicial qualifications commission
may be preferable to life tenure for judges.
However, a merit selection system along the lines previously
described is more likely to produce good judges than elections
and to insulate judges from the influence of money and the
passions of the moment so that they can make decisions based on
the law. Unless the southern states adopt such systems in the
near future, those most in need of protections of the courts and
the law will be left unprotected, and the new era of states' rights
will be little more than a less blatant form of the Jim Crow
justice and legal lynchings of the recent past.
